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Background. Higher prices for unprotected sex threaten the high levels of condom use that contributed to the
decline in Zimbabwe’s human immunodeﬁciency virus (HIV) epidemic. To improve understanding of ﬁnancial
pressures competing against safer sex, we explore factors associated with the price of commercial sex in rural eastern
Zimbabwe.
Methods. We collected and analyzed cross-sectional data on 311 women, recruited during October–December
2010, who reported that they received payment for their most-recent or second-most-recent sex acts in the past year.
Zero-inﬂated negative binomial models with robust standard errors clustered on female sex worker (FSW) were used
to explore social and behavioral determinants of price.
Results. The median price of sex was $10 (interquartile range [IQR], $5–$20) per night and $10 (IQR, $5–$15)
per act. Amounts paid in cash and commodities did not differ signiﬁcantly. At the most-recent sex act, more-edu-
cated FSWs received 30%–74% higher payments. Client requests for condom use signiﬁcantly predicted protected
sex (P < .01), but clients paid on average 42.9% more for unprotected sex.
Conclusions. Within a work environment where clients’ preferences determine condom use, FSWs effectively
use their individual capital to negotiate the terms of condom use. Strengthening FSWs’ preferences for protected sex
could help maintain high levels of condom use.
Keywords. female sex work; payments; condom use; sub-Saharan Africa.
Price premiums for unprotected sex with female sex
workers (FSWs) could limit the success of behavioral
interventions aimed to increase condom use in com-
mercial transactions [1–3]. FSWs have reported ﬁnan-
cial coercion (ie, clients’ refusal to pay unless sex is
unprotected) [2] and willingness not to use condoms
for a higher price [1–3]. Behavioral economists have ar-
gued that the price of unprotected sex is determined by
FSW preferences for protection, client preferences for
unprotected sex, and the respective bargaining powers
of each group [4]. Targeted interventions may strength-
en FSW preferences for condom use, which then
require greater premiums to reverse [3]. Conversely,
illness or economic shocks at individual, household,
or community levels may increase willingness to
supply unprotected sex to meet additional expenditures
[5, 6].
Since 2000, Zimbabwe has experienced a prolonged
economic decline, with hyperinﬂation, food shortages,
and deep poverty [7]. Zimbabwe’s human immunodeﬁ-
ciency virus (HIV) epidemic is one of the severest
worldwide but has declined partly because of behavior
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change, including increased condom use between commercial
sex partners [8, 9].
During the economic collapse, rural sex work became more
diffuse and less professional, and sex was sold for commodities
in lieu of cash [10].However, little is known quantitatively about
factors affecting the price of sex. Understanding ﬁnancial pres-
sures competing against safer sex and the factors that increase
commercial payments in FSWs is key to designing interventions
that promote condom use or aim to incentivize behaviors, such
as cash transfers [11].
We identify potential determinants of price in the FSW pop-
ulation that could confound the relationship between condom
use and price, examine the association of condom use with
client and FSW preferences for protected sex, and examine dif-
ferences in the prices of protected and unprotected sex.
METHODS
Data Collection
Data came from round 2 of an open-cohort study conducted in
4 neighboring but socioeconomically diverse communities—a
small town, a roadside trading center, a commercial forestry
estate, and a subsistence farming area—in Manicaland, eastern
Zimbabwe [10]. Data collection methods are described in the
Supplementary Materials. Women aged ≥18 years who report-
ed ever having had transactional sex were recruited between
March 2010 and May 2011, using venue-based and snowball
methods. To participants providing informed consent, trained
interviewers asked questions face to face about demographic
characteristics and sexual behavior. In informal conﬁdential
voting interviews designed to reduce social-desirability bias
[12], respondents self-completed answers to questions about
their 2 most-recent sex partners (none were illiterate). Ethical
approval was obtained from the Medical Research Council of
Zimbabwe (MRCZ/A/681) and Imperial College Research
Ethics Committee (ICREC_9_3_13).
Outcome and Exposure Variables
We restricted analysis to women who reported in informal con-
ﬁdential voting interviews that at least one of their 2 most-
recent sex partners within the past year was commercial.
The primary outcome was the amount in 2010 US dollars (or
equivalent value of goods) received for commercial sex. We in-
cluded so-called zero-payments from clients, to allow for those
who pay on credit at the end of an agreed period instead of per
encounter [10, 13]. Missing payments were excluded (sensitivity
analyses are in the Supplementary Materials).
Condom use during the most-recent sex encounters (an
encounter can comprise ≥1 sex act) was measured as the num-
ber of protected acts. Since most individuals reported that either
all (62.4%) or no acts were protected (30.8%), condom use was
coded as a binary variable by subtracting the number of
protected acts from the total number of acts reported to
represent consistent use of condoms (ie, all acts were protected)
versus inconsistent use or nonuse of condom (not all acts were
protected).
Potential Determinants of the Price of Sex Among FSWs
A literature review identiﬁed a number of factors associated
with price that could be confounders. Positively associated fac-
tors included FSW attractiveness [4], duration in sex work [3],
and certain sexual practices (eg, anal and oral sex) [14]. Increas-
ing age [3] and FSW poverty [15] were negatively correlated
with price. We used age as a proxy for physical attractiveness
[3, 4], occupation and marital status as proxies for FSW wealth
(with the assumption that a union implies dual incomes), and
dry sex (ie, drying of the vaginal passage to increase pleasure) as
an example of premium service. Repeat clients may negotiate
lower prices [16], condom use is often lower than with new cli-
ents [17]), and client preference for unprotected sex is associat-
ed with price [4]. Women in poorer areas may be more willing
to accept incentives for unprotected sex [2]. As an indicator of
socioeconomic status [18], study area was considered as a
group-level factor. The number of areas (4) was considered to
be too small for the size of the data set to detect variation be-
tween groups in multilevel modeling [19], but we tested spatial
clustering with the intraclass cluster coefﬁcient [19, 20].
Preliminary analyses tested differences in potential determi-
nants of price between women reporting one of the last 2 part-
ners as commercial (FSW1s) and women reporting that both
were commercial (FSW2s), using χ2 analysis (or the Fisher
exact test) and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for continuous var-
iables. In these analyses, the 2 groups were signiﬁcantly differ-
ent, so they were subsequently analyzed separately.
Client and FSW Preferences for Protected Sex and
Association With Condom Use
We used variables that separately denoted client and FSW re-
quests for condoms as a proxy for their preferences. Positive an-
swers indicated a preference for condom use, and we interpreted
negative responses as indicating no preference for protected sex.
Spearman correlation coefﬁcients, stratiﬁed by the request type
(ie, client, FSW, and joint), were used for testing the null hy-
pothesis that number of acts and number of protected acts
were independent (ie, a measure of consistency of condom use).
Expected Payments for Sex
The paired Wilcoxon signed rank test was used to test whether
the amount each woman expected to receive (ie, prices) for pro-
tected sex differed from that received for unprotected sex,
whether the amount received for a full-night sexual encounter
differed from that received for a short-duration sexual encoun-
ter (usually a single sex act), and whether these expectations
were met in FSWs’ most-recent commercial encounters.
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Independent Determinants of the Price of Sex
Separate multivariable regressions were conducted for the 2
FSW groups. Factors signiﬁcant at a P value of <.2 in univariate
analyses were included in the multivariable model [21].Discrete
and continuous variables were described by median and inter-
quartile ranges (IQRs). Continuous variables were mean cen-
tered; nonlinear relationships were explored by categorizing
into quartiles. Age was categorized into 18–24, 25–34, 35–44,
and ≥45 years. Final model variables were selected from full
models by means of backward stepwise elimination (threshold
to remove: P<.05), using likelihood ratio tests between nested
models and minimizing the Akaike information criterion
(AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) to select be-
tween different nonnested models (Wald tests replaced likeli-
hood ratio tests when sandwich estimators were used [20]).
We regressed price on its predictors by using zero-inﬂated
negative binomial (ZINB) models to account for nonnegative,
overdispersed distributions with excess zeros [22], allowing in-
clusion of clients who paid on credit and so may have given zero
payment at the most-recent sex encounter—so-called structural
zeros [23]. The ZINB model assumes that the data are generated
by a mixture of 2 processes. A Bernoulli trial determines with a
probability p whether a zero count is produced or with a prob-
ability [1 − p] whether a count (either zero or positive) is gen-
erated from a negative binomial distribution. Coefﬁcients from
the count part of the model are interpreted as coefﬁcients from
a negative binomial (NB) regression; coefﬁcients from the binary
part are interpreted as logistic-regression coefﬁcients [22]. For
FSW2s, we compared ﬁnal models with unclustered and robust
standard errors clustered on the individual to adjust for the un-
derlying correlation within FSWs.
Model ﬁt was assessed using the AIC, the BIC, and the Vuong
test to discriminate between NB and ZINB models [22].We as-
sessed the sensitivity of the ﬁnal model to its inputs by exploring
misclassiﬁcation bias and outlier inﬂuence [20, 21] (Supple-
mentary Information).
Relationships between predictors and payments in the count
part of the ZINB are interpreted as percentage changes in pay-
ments for a unit of change in the predictor (derived from the
NB coefﬁcients), holding all other variables constant. Associa-
tion of a particular predictor and zero counts in the binary part
of the ZINB is interpreted as the odds of zero payments in ex-
cess of that expected under a NB process. Analyses were con-
ducted in Stata/SE 11.2 (StataCorp).
RESULTS
Of 458 observations in 311 women who reported having a com-
mercial sex partner in the past year, there were 134 and 136 re-
ported outcomes for the most-recent commercial partner of
FSW1s and FSW2s, respectively, and 143 observations for the
second-most-recent commercial partner of FSW2s.
Characteristics and Determinants of Price of Sex Among FSWs
Across a range of characteristics, FSW1s were signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent from FSW2s (Table 1). FSW1s were older, less likely to
report sex work as their occupation, started sex work later,
had been selling sex for fewer years, were less likely to request
condom use, were more likely to have clients paying on credit,
and were less likely to self-identify as a FSW in the last year
(25.5% vs 63.3%; P < .01). Over the 6 months prior to complet-
ing the survey, 76.2% of FSW1s regularly sold sex on credit, and
37.8% sold sex per encounter; 74.2% and 76.9% of FSW2s reg-
ularly sold sex on credit and per encounter, respectively. The
median duration since most-recent commercial sex was 21
days (IQR, 7–100 days) for FSW1s and 7 days (IQR, 2–16
days) for FSW2s.
The intraclass cluster coefﬁcient for area was 0.026 (P = .07),
suggesting no signiﬁcant evidence of between-area differences.
Client and FSW Preferences for Protected Sex and Association
With Condom use
Most FSWs (83.6%) requested condom use with their most-
recent client, but only 54.4% reported their client requested
condoms (Table 1). The total number of sex acts and the num-
ber of protected acts were correlated when clients requested
condom use (Spearman rho = 0.71; P < .01) but uncorrelated
when they did not (rho = 0.07; P = .5). The same patterns
were found irrespective of what women requested: when both
clients and FSWs requested condoms and when clients but
not FSWs requested condom use, total and protected acts
were correlated (rho = 0.73 and rho = 0.88, respectively); when
neither clients nor FSWs requested condoms and when FSWs
but not clients requested condom use, total and unprotected
acts were uncorrelated (rho = 0.03 and rho = 0.12, respectively).
These results were consistent across both FSW groups (data not
shown), although FSW1s were less likely to request condoms
(P = .04). Condom use did not differ by client type for FSW1s
(P = .7) or FSW2s (P = .09).
Expected Payments for Sex
Compared with FSW2s, fewer FSW1s reported an expected
amount per night or per short duration (Table 1), but similar
proportions reported an expected weekly, fortnightly, or
monthly payment. There were no signiﬁcant differences in the
distributions of expected payments: median expected amounts
for FSW1s and FSW2s were $9.2 (IQR, $5–$15) and $7.5 (IQR,
$5–$10), respectively, for short durations (P = .4); $30 (IQR,
$20–$50) and $30 (IQR, $15–$50), respectively, for longer-
term payments (P = .9); and $12.5 (IQR, $10–$20) in both
groups for a full night.
The median expected amount per full-night encounter
among all FSWs was $10.0 (IQR, $10–$20) for protected sex
and $20.0 (IQR, $10–$30) for unprotected sex; for a short-
duration encounter, the median expected amount was $5.0
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Table 1. Tests for Difference in Sociodemographic and Behavioral Characteristics of Female Sex Workers Reporting 1 Commercial Sex
Partner at the Most Recent Sex Act (FSW1) or 2 Commercial Sex Partners at the Most Recent and Second Most Recent Sex Encounters
(FSW2) in the Past Year and Univariable Associations With Price
Characteristics
FSW1 FSW2 (Most Recent Commercial Partner) Test for
Difference
Proportion or Median
Univariable ZINB β
Coefficient (95% CI) Proportion or Median
Univariable ZINB β
Coefficient (95% CI) P Value
A: General sociodemographic and behavioral characteristics
Age, y 36 (29–42) (n = 133) −0.02 (−.04 to −.00)a 32 (27–38) (n = 133) −0.01 (−.02 to .01) .02
Location of
residence
136
Town 44/134 (32.8) Reference 63/136 (46.3) Reference .05
Estate 35/134 (26.1) −0.09 (−.57 to .40) 20/136 (14.7) 0.45 (.02 to .88)a
SFA 19/134 (14.2) 0.28 (−.30 to .87) 21/136 (15.4) 0.66 (.24 to 1.08)b
RTC 36/134 (26.9) 0.34 (−.12 to .80) 32/136 (23.5) 0.67 (.29 to 1.05)c
Residence
duration, y
10 (3–28) (n = 133) −0.02 (−.03 to −.00)a 7 (3–21) (n = 133) 0.01 (−.00 to .02)d .28
Marital history .19
Previously
married
103/134 (76.9) Reference 106/136 (77.9) Reference
Still in union 14/134 (10.5) 0.64 (.06 to 1.22)a 7/136 (5.15) 1.11 (.44 to 1.78)b
Never married
single
17/134 (12.7) 0.37 (−.22 to .95) 23/136 (16.9) −0.09 (−.49 to .31)
Education level .11
None/primary 57/133 (42.9) Reference 45/135 (33.3) Reference
Secondary/
higher
76/133 (57.1) 0.75 (.40 to 1.11)c 90/135 (66.7) 0.40 (.07 to .73)a
Occupation .01
Formal
employment
20/132 (15.5) Reference 8/132 (6.82) Reference
Informal
employment
43/132 (32.6) −0.11 (−.74 to .51) 64/132 (48.5) 0.30 (−.36 to .96)
Unemployed 69/132 (52.3) 0.14 (−.45 to .72) 59/132 (44.7) 0.20 (−.47 to .87)
Occupation is sex
worker
8/132 (6.06) −0.11 (−.86 to .64) 27/132 (20.5) 0.02 (−.36 to .39) <.01
Cohabit with a
partner
24/134 (17.9) 0.54 (.05 to 1.02)a 15/136 (11.0) −0.38 (−.88 to .12)d .11
Age at sexual
debut, y
.22
12–16 (Q1) 38/133 (28.5) Reference 48/136 (35.3) Reference
17–18 (Q2) 39/133 (29.3) 0.12 (−.34 to .58) 46/136 (33.8) −0.24 (−.61 to .13)
19–20 (Q3) 30/133 (22.6) 0.49 (−.03 to 1.00) 19/136 (14.0) 0.01 (−.45 to .47)
≥21 (Q4) 26/133 (19.6) 0.01 (−.52 to .53) 23/136 (16.9) 0.27 (−.17 to .71)
Age at sex work
debut, y
<.01
12–20 (Q1) 25/134 (18.7) Reference 48/136 (35.3) Referenced
21–25 (Q2) 25/134 (18.7) −0.09 (−.68 to .49) 38/136 (27.9) −0.12 (−.52 to .28)
26–31 (Q3) 40/134 (29.9) −0.22 (−.77 to .33) 32/136 (23.5) −0.12 (−.52 to .29)
32–54 (Q4) 44/134 (32.8) −0.37 (−.90 to .17) 18/136 (13.2) −0.29 (−.79 to .21)
Age at sex work
debut, y
29 (22–33) (n = 134) 23 (20–29) (n = 136) <.01
Time in sex work, y 5 (2–9) (n = 134) −0.02 (−.04 to .01)d 7 (3–13) (n = 136) 0.00 (−.02 to .03) .01
Travelled to sell sex .15
Never 102/134 (76.1) Reference 96/136 (70.6) Reference
>1 mo 12/134 (8.96) 0.04 (−.56 to .65) 23/136 (16.9) 0.44 (.02 to .86)a
In past mo 20/134 (14.9) −0.57 (−1.10 to −.04)a 17/136 (12.5) 0.05 (−.43 to .53)
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Table 1 continued.
Characteristics
FSW1 FSW2 (Most Recent Commercial Partner) Test for
Difference
Proportion or Median
Univariable ZINB β
Coefficient (95% CI) Proportion or Median
Univariable ZINB β
Coefficient (95% CI) P Value
STI in last year 19/134 (14.2) −0.63 (−1.16 to −.10)a 19/136 (14.0) 0.12 (−.33 to .58) .96
Typically expect
amount per night
of sex
56/134 (41.8) . . . 108/136 (79.4) . . . <.01
Typically expect
amount per short
duration
48/134 (35.8) . . . 101/136 (74.3) . . . <.01
Typically expect
amount per
longer period
(weekly,
fortnightly, or
monthly)
68/134 (50.8) . . . 77/136 (56.6) . . . .33
B: Characteristics of the encounter with the most-recent commercial partner
Price received, US$ 10 (5–20) (n = 134) . . . 10 (5–20) (n = 136) . . . .48
Place for sex
negotiatione
.15
Private location 66/134 (49.3) Reference 64/132 (47.1) Reference
Drinking location 17/134 (12.7) 0.12(−.48 to .71) 29/132 (21.3) −0.24 (−.64 to .15)
Public location 51/134 (38.1) 0.06 (−.34 to .46) 43/132 (31.6) 0.13 (−.23 to .48)
Location of the
transaction
.85
Urban 75/134 (56.0) Reference 74/135 (54.8) Reference
Rural location 59/134 (44.0) −0.33 (−.70 to .04)d 61/135 (45.2) −0.06 (−.38 to .26)
Type of sex partnerf <.01
New commercial
partner
37/134 (27.6) Reference 41/132 (30.2) Reference
Repeat
commercial
partner (pays
per encounter)
19/134 (14.2) 0.02 (−.52 to .56) 50/132 (36.8) 0.05 (−.31 to .41)
Commercial
partner pays on
credit
56/134 (41.8) −0.15 (−.57 to .28) 31/132 (22.8) 0.43 (.01 to .85)a
Regular
commercial
partner (gives
according to my
needs)
22/134 (16.4) 0.05 (.49 to .59) 14/132 (10.3) −0.10 (−.67 to .46)
Type of paymentg .08
Commodities 28/117 (23.9) . . . 19/126 (15.1) . . .
Cash 89/117 (76.1) . . . 107/126 (84.9) . . .
Age of sex partner, y .03
<35 42/129 (32.6) Reference 63/131 (48.1) Reference
35–44 48/129 (37.2) −0.34 (−.79 to .12) 41/131 (31.3) 0.19 (−.16 to .54)
≥45 39/129 (30.2) −0.41 (−.87 to .05)d 27/131 (20.6) 0.04 (−.36 to .45)
Type of encounter .58
Full night 78/134 (58.2) Reference 83/135 (61.5) Reference
Short duration 56/134 (41.8) −0.49 (−.89 to −.19)b 52/135 (38.5) −0.29 (−.61 to .03)d
Sex acts, no. 2 (1–3) (n = 133) 2 (2–3) (n = 133) 0.19 (.08 to .31)b .04
Dry sex 29/133 (21.8) 0.25 (−.19 to .70) 35/133 (26.3) 0.55 (.20 to .90)b .39
Condom use .80
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(IQR, $5–$10) and $10.0 (IQR, $5–$15) for protected and un-
protected sex, respectively (Supplementary Figure 1). Among
FSWs who reported charges for both protected and unprotected
sex, FSW2s expected higher median payments for unprotected
sex versus protected sex ($13.8 [IQR, $10–$25] vs $10.0
[IQR, $7.5–$15]; n = 62; P < .01). There was no signiﬁcant dif-
ference in the payments expected for unprotected and protected
sex for FSW1s (P = .1). FSWs expected higher median amounts
for full-night encounters, compared with short-duration
encounters ($13.3 [IQR, $10–$23] vs $7.5 [IQR, $5–$10];
P < .01). The average expected amount was not signiﬁcantly
different from that received from the most-recent commercial
partner (P = .3). Cash payments ($10 [IQR, $6.5–$20]) were
not signiﬁcantly different from commodity payments ($10
[IQR, $6–$20]; P = .4). Regular clients made up 88% of zero
payments (21 of 24).
Univariable and Multivariable Associations With Price of Sex
Signiﬁcant determinants in univariable associations of price of
sex with most-recent commercial partner that were common to
both FSW groups were marital status, cohabitation status, edu-
cation level, FSW mobility, and number of sex acts (Table 1).
Other signiﬁcant determinants for FSW1s were age, residential
duration, recent sexually transmitted infection, duration in sex
work, location of most-recent sex, partner’s age, and type of en-
counter. Other signiﬁcant predictors for FSW2s were area of
residence, partner type, dry sex, condom use, and client and
FSW requests for condom use.
Table 2 presents the adjusted coefﬁcients for predictors of
price in a ﬁnal model for FSW1s (model 1) and 3 ﬁnal models
for FSW2s (one model involving their most-recent client only
[model 2] and two models involving both recent clients, one
unclustered [model 3] and one individually clustered [model
4]). In the count part of models 1 and 2, more-educated
FSW1s and FSW2s had 73.4% and 40.3% higher average pay-
ments, respectively, with their most-recent commercial part-
ners, holding all other variables constant. In models 3 and 4,
when both clients were considered, higher education level in-
creased mean payments by 32.8%. The odds of excess zero pay-
ments insigniﬁcantly decreased with education level for FSW1s
but increased for FSW2s. Similarly, the odds of excess zero pay-
ments increased with increasing number of sex acts among
FSW1s but decreased for FSW2s.
For each additional year a FSW1 resides in the area, their ex-
pected mean payment decreases by 1.5%, but for each addition-
al sex act, their expected mean payment increases by 30.9%.
Marital status and client preference for condom use were both
signiﬁcantly associated with price at the most-recent sex act for
Table 1 continued.
Characteristics
FSW1 FSW2 (Most Recent Commercial Partner) Test for
Difference
Proportion or Median
Univariable ZINB β
Coefficient (95% CI) Proportion or Median
Univariable ZINB β
Coefficient (95% CI) P Value
100%
(consistent)
84/133 (63.2) Reference 82/133 (61.7) Reference
<100%
(inconsistent)
49/133 (36.8) 0.07 (−.32 to .45) 51/133 (38.4) 0.38 (.07 to .70)a
Client asked for
condomh
73/134 (54.5) 0.12 (−.26 to .49) 74/135 (54.8) 0.48 (.18 to .78)b .99
FSW asked for
condomh
105/129 (81.4) −0.05 (−0.47 to .38) 120/133 (90.2) −0.54 (−1.00 to −.08)a .04
Data are proportion (%) of participants or median value (interquartile range). Differences between FSW1 and FSW2were calculated using χ2 and Fisher exact test, for
categorical variables, and Wilcoxon rank sum tests, for continuous variables. Variables that were significant at a P value of < .2 were included in the multivariable
models.
Abbreviations: CI, confidence interval; RTC, roadside trading center; SFA, subsistence farming area; STI, sexually transmitted infection; ZINB, zero-inflated negative
binomial.
a P < .05.
b P < .01.
c P < .001.
d P < .2.
e Private locations were FSWs’, clients’, or other people’s homes; drinking locations included bars, bottle stores, and nightclubs; public locations included bus stops,
roadsides, markets, and church.
f Clients who paid on credit paid a prenegotiated amount at an agreed future point (eg, in a month or fortnight). Short durations typically involve only 1 act of sex, in
contrast to a full night, during which there will be several acts of sex.
g Missing zero payments.
h Responses of “don’t know” were excluded.
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Table 2. Multivariable Zero-Inﬂated Negative Binomial Models Showing the Regression of Price Received for the Most Recent Commercial Sex Act Among Female Sex Workers
Reporting 1 Commercial Sex Partner at the Most Recent Sex Act (FSW1) or 2 Commercial Sex Partners at the Most Recent and Second Most Recent Sex Acts (FSW2) in the Past
Year Against Its Predictors
Variable
Model 1: FSW1
(n = 127, zeros = 14)
Model 2: FSW2, Most Recent
Partner Included
(n = 125, zeros = 9)
Model 3: FSW2, Both Partners
Included, Unclustered
(n = 252, zeros = 18)
Model 4: FSW2, Both Partners
Included, Clustered on FSW
(n = 252, zeros = 18)
Excess Zeros NB Estimate Excess Zeros NB Estimate Excess Zeros NB Estimate Excess Zeros NB Estimate
Logit β Coefficient
(95% CI)
Log β Coefficient
(95% CI)
Logit β Coefficient
(95% CI)
Log β Coefficient
(95% CI)
Logit β Coefficient
(95% CI)
Log β Coefficient
(95% CI)
Logit β Coefficient
(95% CI)
Log β Coefficient
(95% CI)
Marital history (vs previously
married)
. . . . . . Reference Reference . . . . . . . . . . . .
Still in union . . . . . . −17.6 (−23 776 to
23 741)
0.99 (.39 to 1.60)a . . . . . . . . . . . .
Never married . . . . . . 0.59 (−1.44 to
2.63)
−0.10 (−.48 to
.28)
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Secondary education (vs
primary education)
−0.57 (−2.34 to
1.20)
0.55 (.20 to .90)a 1.29 (−2.03 to
4.62)
0.36 (.06 to .65)b 0.42 (−1.03 to
1.88)
0.28 (.08 to .49)a 0.42 (−1.38 to
2.23)
0.28 (.00 to .56)b
Years of residence −0.09 (−.28 to
.10)
−0.02 (−.03 to
−.00)b
. . . -. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Occupation is sex worker (vs
not)
. . . . . . . . . . . . −21.24 (−46 010
to 45 967)c
0.37 (.12 to .62)a −21.2 (−22.6 to
−19.9)d
0.37 (.04 to .69)b
Most recent sex partner vs
new client
. . . . . . . . . . . . Reference Reference Reference Reference
Repeat client . . . . . . . . . . . . −1.06 (−3.58 to
1.46)
0.25 (−.01 to .52) −1.06 (−4.26 to
2.14)
0.25 (−.06 to .57)
Regular client (pay on credit) . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.07 (−.87 to 3.00) 0.43 (.15 to .71)a 1.07 (−1.17 to
3.31)
0.43 (.05 to .82)b
Regular client (pay
according to FSW need)
. . . . . . . . . . . . −0.47 (−3.40 to
2.46)
−0.23 (−.59 to .13) −0.47 (−3.74 to
2.80)
−0.23 (−.63 to
.17)
Dry sex (vs no dry sex) . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.96 (−.50 to 2.43) 0.44 (.20 to .68)d 0.96 (−1.15 to
3.08)
0.44 (.10 to .78)b
No. of sex acts >1 0.16 (−0.68 to
1.00)
0.27 (.10 to .43)a −0.22 (−.97 to
.53)
0.15 (.06 to .25)a −0.26 (−.89 to
.36)
0.12 (.03 to .20)a −0.26 (−1.05 to
.52)
0.12 (.03 to .21)a
Client does not request
condom use (vs client
requests)
. . . . . . 0.13 (−1.63 to
1.89)
0.45 (.16 to .73)a . . . . . . . . . . . .
Unprotected sex (vs condom
use)
. . . . . . . . . . . . 1.11 (−.24 to 2.46) 0.36 (.14 to .57)d 1.11 (−.56 to 2.78) 0.36 (.09 to .62)a
Value Value Value Value
Vuong test of ZINB vs standard
NB
z = 1.49, P= .068 z = 1.51, P= .065 z = 2.87, P< .01 . . .
Log likelihood −469 −454 −913 −913
AIC 956.8 935.3 1864.2 1864.2
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FSW2s (model 2), but when both partners of FSW2s were in-
cluded, only partner type, dry sex, sex work as an occupation,
and condom use were signiﬁcantly associated with price (mod-
els 3 and 4).
In the count process of models 3 and 4, holding all other var-
iables constant, unprotected sex increased the mean payment by
42.9%, clients who paid on credit and repeat clients (vs new cli-
ents) increased the expected payment by 56.2% and 28.3%, re-
spectively. Each additional sex act increased the mean payment
by 12.6%; providing dry sex and reporting their occupation as
sex work increased the mean payment by 56.9% and 44.4%, re-
spectively. The odds of excess zero payments signiﬁcantly de-
creased when sex work was reported as an occupation but
insigniﬁcantly decreased for repeat clients (vs new clients)
and with additional sex acts independently (model 4). There
was a nonsigniﬁcant increase in the odds of excess zero pay-
ments with dry sex, regular clients, and unprotected sex
independently.
In sensitivity analyses, inclusion of missing values did not
qualitatively alter ﬁndings (Supplementary Materials).
DISCUSSION
This study improves understanding of how payments for com-
mercial encounters are determined and what factors are impor-
tant to price negotiations. The median price for the most-recent
commercial sex per night ($10 [IQR, $5–$20]) was consistent
with the range of prices (2010 real value, US$11.6–$17.1) in
studies conducted prior to the economic crisis elsewhere in
Zimbabwe [14, 24]. Short-duration encounters ($10 [IQR, $5–
15]) were slightly higher than per-act prices in other studies
(2010 US$2.5–$7.5) [25], which likely reﬂects short durations
occasionally consisting of >1 act. Most payments were in
cash, but commodity payments were of equivalent value.
Few studies have explored rural sex work in sub-Saharan
Africa and typically only in comparison with urban FSWs
[26, 27]. This in-depth study of rural FSWs identiﬁed distinct
operations: FSW1s tended to sell sex on credit to regular clients
who paid weekly or monthly, and FSW2s regularly sought both
pay-per-encounter and on-credit clients, with the ﬁrst forming
the majority of recent clients. Despite these differences, the
price for the most-recent sex encounter was comparable be-
tween FSW1s and FSW2s, and condom use (63.2% and 61.7%,
respectively) was similar to levels reported by FSWs in a nearby
city (65.2%) [28].
In a collapsed economy, with a reduced demand for paid sex
[10, 29], extreme poverty might have reduced differences in
prices between protected and unprotected sex. However, we
found that, within a work environment in which clients domi-
nated decisions over safer sex, the more-professional FSWs,
who were more experienced at selling sex, effectively negotiated
the terms of the transaction: unprotected sex increased theTa
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mean payment by 43%, compared with protected sex, conﬁrm-
ing initial ﬁndings. In contrast, prices for protected and
unprotected sex were not statistically different among less-
professional FSWs, perhaps reﬂecting limited capacity to
demand higher prices, particularly with regular clients with
whom issues of trust, rather than price, may determine unpro-
tected sex [13]. Meanwhile, FSW2s also provided dry sex for
higher prices. Dry sex weakened but did not eliminate the
condom-use effect, suggesting interference but not deterrence
of condom use [30].
In multivariable analyses, education level and number of sex
acts were consistently positively associated with price across
FSWs and partners. Although greater education level is often
viewed as a means to increase job opportunities, reduce reliance
on commercial sex, or exit sex work, it also beneﬁts FSWs re-
maining in sex work, who obtain higher prices. Numeracy
and literacy may help with negotiating prices [4], and they are
also linked with higher-paid clients [18].
Repeat and regular clients paid higher prices than new clients
with FSW2s, contrasting with research in US sex workers who
gave repeat clients discounts [16] but consistent with Kenyan
FSWs receiving higher payments from regular partners [27]. Av-
erage payments reﬂect the count process and not the total pop-
ulation effect, which is inﬂuenced by the excess zeros. Higher
prices from regular clients might reﬂect selection bias: wealthier
clients (who pay more for sex) can afford to buy sex regularly
[29]; FSWs might select wealthier clients as regular partners.
In contrast to studies elsewhere, we found no evidence of as-
sociations of price with age [27], duration in sex work [3], loca-
tion or place where sex was negotiated [1, 2, 26], or encounter
type [16]. Absence of an association with age might reﬂect the
maturity of the FSW population and underrepresentation of
FSWs aged <18 years and women starting sex work. Other sig-
niﬁcant variables likely capture some of these effects: for exam-
ple, residential duration was negatively associated with price
and was positively associated with age (data not shown), and
numbers of acts were higher in full-night encounters (P < .01).
Levels of consistent condom use comparable to those in other
studies [28] suggest that the informal conﬁdential voting inter-
views minimized social-desirability bias.
Despite enthusiasm for biomedical interventions, our results
demonstrate potential gains from condom promotion: strength-
ening preferences for protected sex, including for less-visible
FSWs, could make unprotected sex less affordable [4]. Such
strategies would beneﬁt from enhanced social capital and col-
lective action (eg, ﬁxing prices) to reduce competitive pressure
for unprotected sex [13].
This is the ﬁrst analysis of the determinants of payments for
sex among FSWs in Zimbabwe. Within a context where clients’
preferences governed the use of condoms, professional FSWs
negotiated higher prices for unprotected sex. High individual
capital among hidden and professional FSWs suggests that
strengthening preferences for condom use could be effective
in maintaining high levels of safer sex.
Supplementary Data
Supplementary materials are available at The Journal of Infectious Diseases
online (http://jid.oxfordjournals.org). Supplementary materials consist of
data provided by the author that are published to beneﬁt the reader. The
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data are the sole responsibility of the authors. Questions or messages regard-
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